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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
No. 19-3659
________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
MATTHEW NABER,
Appellant
________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(District Court No. 2-04-cr-00173-001)
District Judge: Hon. Susan D. Wigenton
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
May 19, 2020
Before: McKEE, BIBAS and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed: July 17, 2020)
___________
OPINION
___________



This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

McKEE, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Matthew Naber was eligible for, but did not receive, a sentencing
reduction from the district court under the First Step Act.1 He appeals on the grounds
that the district court failed to adequately support its discretionary denial of a downward
reduction. While we agree a more thorough explanation would have been beneficial, we
find ample support in the record for the district court’s decision to deny relief. Thus, we
will affirm.2
I.
We review a district court’s decision whether to grant a reduction in sentence for
abuse of discretion.3 That deferential standard is easily satisfied in this case. Because we
write primarily for the parties, who are well familiar with the facts, we do not repeat them
at length here. Naber was arrested for drug distribution while on probation for a previous
significant drug offense.4 Because of his past convictions, the nature of his present
offense, and as part of an explicit effort to deter his future recidivism, the district court
imposed the statutory maximum 60-month sentence.5 We affirmed that sentence.6 Naber

1

First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404(b), 132 Stat. 5194, 5222.
The district court had subject matter jurisdiction in this criminal case over the
Appellant’s motion for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act through 18 U.S.C. §
3582(c)(1)(B). We have jurisdiction over this subsequent appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
3
United States v. Rodriguez, 855 F.3d 526, 529 (3d Cir. 2017) as amended (May 1,
2017).
4
App. 40-44.
5
App. 59-63.
6
United States v. Naber, 737 Fed. App’x 81 (3d Cir. 2018).
2
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later sought a reduction under the First Step Act, which permits district courts to correct
excessive sentences imposed on crack cocaine offenders under 21 U.S.C. §
841(b)(1)(A).7 The district court declined to afford Naber that opportunity, and “having
read all the submissions from the parties and for the reasons set forth on the record[,]”
denied his motion.8
Naber argues that this terse order fails to explain the court’s rationale, or even
whether it indeed found him eligible for a reduction but chose to deny relief. He urges
that this violates the requirement that “the judge ‘must adequately explain the chosen
sentence to allow for meaningful appellate review.’”9 We share his concern for a
sufficiently developed rationale, and no one could doubt the district court could have
bolstered its explanation for denying relief here. The government tacitly admits as much,
analogizing this language to the “barebones” order the Supreme Court found appropriate
in the context of a simple case in Chavez-Meza.10 There, a form order was sufficient
because “there was not much else for the judge to say.”11 Here, the government
effectively conceded Naber’s eligibility under the First Step Act, making the decision on
that point a foregone conclusion. Given Naber’s history of recidivism, the violent nature
of some of his offenses, and his lagging efforts at rehabilitation in prison, each of which
the court had carefully considered in imposing the original sentence, the reasons for the
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First Step Act § 404(b), 132 Stat. at 5222.
App. 3.
9
Chavez-Meza v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 1959, 1965 (2018) (quoting Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 50 (2007)).
10
Id. at 1967-68.
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Id. at 1967.
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court’s denial are plainly evident in the record. We therefore cannot find that the court
abused its discretion in failing to provide a more complete explanation in this particular
situation.
II.
For the reasons stated above, we will affirm the order of the district court.
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